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CASE NOTES

unconscionable contracts. Attorneys with a buyer client, who
feels he has been wronged by an allegedly unconscionable
contract, will do well to cite the Williams case in support of
their cause. And finally, merchants who make a practice of
using standardized contract forms, which are unreasonably
favorable towards themselves, may be well inclined to change
this practice in the event a substantial number of buyer's are
found to have entered unconscionable contracts by courts
which follow the rationale of the Williams case.
DENNIS It. YRANCISHI

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-Deliberate and Purposeful Delay Between The Date
of the Commission of a Crime and the First Filing of Charges as Viola-

tion of Defendant's Fifth Amendment Due Process Right To a Fair Trial.
Ross v. United States, 349 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1965).

The defendant was arrested and charged with violation
of federal narcotics laws seven months after the date of
the alleged offense. Immediately after the commission of the
offense, law enforcement officers had probable cause to
believe that the defendant was the person who had committed
it. He was continuously available during this period of time,
but the arrest was purposely delayed in order to prevent disclosure of the identity of the undercover agent who was con'ducting a continuing investigation of narcotics violations in
the area and who was the only witness against the defendant.
At the trial the defendant claimed that he was unable to recall his whereabouts and activities on the date of the alleged
offense. The government's only evidence, aside from the
'drugs allegedly sold to the agent by the defendant, was the
agent's testimony which he could not give without refreshing
his memory from a notebook. The defendant was convicted
and he appealed, contending that deliberate and purposeful
delay between offense and complaint violated his rights to
speedy trial and due process guaranteed by the fifth and
sixth amendments to the United States Constitution. Expressly declining to base its decision on the sixth amendment,
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that
deliberate and purposeful delay between the date of the alleged
crime and the date of initiation of criminal proceedings, when
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the 'defendant is unable to recall his whereabouts and activities of the date of the crime, denied the defendant due process
in violation of the fifth amendment.' Conviction reversed.
The principle set forth in this case must be distinguished
from the law relating to a defendants' right to speedy trial
under the sixth amendment and the statutes implementing
that amendment. The sixth amendment law can be summarized in some general propositions.
When violation of right to speedy trial is asserted in
reliance upon the sixth amendment provision, the rule is
usually stated that the accused has a right to a trial which
is free of "vexations, capriocious, and oppressive delays manufactured by the ministers of justice."' The amount of delay
which will be allowed under this generalization depends upon
all of the circumstances of the particular case, but delay for
a reasonable purpose is generally condoned. As stated in
Beavers v. Haubert,4 "The right of a speedy trial is necessarily relative. It is consistent with delays and depends upon
circumstances. It secures rights to a defendant. It does not
preclude the rights of public justice."
In cases where the right is asserted in reliance upon statutes implementing the sixth amendment, it is generally held
that expiration of the time limit in the statute without the
defendants' being tried, per se violates the right.5 Whether
claimed on the basis of a constitutional provision or a statute,
the right accrues to those against whom an information or6
indictment has been filed, although he has not been arrested.
It may also be invoked by those who have been arrested but
delay is imposed between arrest and trial, whether or not the
defendant is confined or free on bail during the interim. This
is because the protection serves purposes other than that of
preventing long imprisonment prior to trial.'
1. Ross v. United States, 349 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
2. BLACK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 584 (2d ed. 1897). See also Chinn v. United
States, 228 F.2d 151, 153 (4th Cir. 1955).
3. Leggett v. Kirby, 231 Ark. 576, 331 S.W.2d 267, cert. denied, 362 U.S. 981
(1960).
4. 198 U.S. 77, 87 (1905).
5. Zehrlaut v. State, 230 Ind. 175, 102 N.E.2d 203 (1951).
6. United States v. Kojima, 3 Hawaii Dist. 381 (1909). On constitutional
assertion of the right see People v. Taylor, 52 Cal. 2d 91, 338 P.2d 377
(1959). Claim based on statute. For an annotation on delay between indictment and arrest in general, see Annot. 85 A.L.R.2d 980 (1962).
7. People v. Prosser, 399 N.Y. 353, 130 N.E.2d 891, 57 A.L.R.2d 295 (1955).
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The most important feature of the sixth amendment law
for purposes of this note is that the right arises only at the
time the defendant is officially charged, whether by indictment, information or arrest. This is because the statutes require trial within some specified time after the accused is
"committed" or "held"' and constitutional language refers
to the "accused." 9
Because of this interpretation placed on the constitutional and statutory language prior to the Ross case, the right
to speedy trial had not been held to apply to one who had not
been charged aid whose arrest was being delayed, even though
the authorities had knowledge of the offense. Thus one commentator declared in 1957, "In no event, however, will the
right to speedy trial arise before there is some charge or
arrest, even though the prosecuting authorities had knowledge
of the offense long before this."1 0 However, the holding of
the principal case was presaged by three cases which followed
the usual speedy trial rules but took into consideration the
delay between the offense and the filing of charges in determi,ning the reasonableness of the delay after the filing of charges
but before trial.
In Petition of Provoo," the court said that a certain
period of detention at an earlier time was irrelevant to the
issue of speedy trial. However, the court added that, "[T]he
effect of that imprisonment is a circumstance to be considered
in deciding whether, under all of the facts of this case, trial
in 1955 on the charges formally made against Provoo in 1949
for acts alleged to have been committeed in 1942-45,2 could
be a 'fair trial,' as that term is used in recent cases.71
8.

WYO. STAT. § 7-234

(1957); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.966 (1954).

9. "In criminal prosecutions, in any court whatever, the party accused shall
have the right to a speedy and public trial .... ." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13.
In People v. Aguirre, 181 Cal. App. 2d, 5 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1960), the court
held that the speedy trial provisions of the state constitution apply only
to "a party accused," and the defendant was not a party accused until
the indictment was returned. Ibid.
Under the federal statute there is no protection for the person claiming
delay between the offense and the formal charge, as that is covered by the
applicable statute of limitations. Harlow v. United States, 301 F.2d 361,
366 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied 371 U.S. 814 (1962).
For a discussion of inapplicability of statutory and constitutional language
see Note, Justice Overdue, Speedy Trial for the PotentialDefendant, 5 STAN.
L. REV. 95 (1952).
10. Note, The Right to Speedy Criminal Trial, 57 COLIJM. L. REV.846, 848 (1957).
11. 17 F.R.D. 183 (D. Md. 1955), aff'd, 350 U.S. 857 (1955).
12. Id. at 202.
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In Taylor v. United States,1 8 there was delay between
the date of the offense and the indictment and further delay
between indictment and trial. The court said that the combination of these delays with the fact that the defendant was
held in confinement and the "[R]esulting handicap to the
procurement of witnesses who might have supported appellants' alibi, or any other defense, must seriously have handicapped the preparation of a defense." 4 The court continued,
declaring that it did not rely on the lapse of time between
the offense and the charge considered by itself, but that, "It
is the combination of the factors set forth above which motivates our decision."'
Seven years later, the same court of appeals in Nickens
v. United States," although affirming the conviction, stated
that "Although it has never been directly 'decided, due process may be denied when a formal charge is delayed for an
unreasonably oppressive and unjustifiable time after the
offense to the prejudice of the accused .-. . ."
Although each of the three cases discussed involved situations in which the 'defendant had been arrested and jailed,
each case is successively more explicit in saying, by way of
dicta, that delay between the offense and the charge could
be a contributing factor in determining that there was unreasonable delay at some later stage of the proceedings.
The principal case, Ross v. United States, went a step
further and held expressly that delays prior to any charge
could, under some circumstances, by themselves constitute a
violation of the due process clause. In reaching its decision
the court considered several factors of special significance,
i.e., the seven month delay was deliberate, the record substantiated the defendant's claim that he could not reconstruct
the events of the 'day in question, and the case against the
defendant was weak, being based solely on the uncorroborated
testimony of the investigator refreshed by a notebook."8
238 F.2d 259 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
Id. at 262.
Ibid.
323 F.2d 808 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
Id. at 810 n. 2. The court cited I Cox's C.C. 114 (Sommerset Winter Assizes 1844) as an example of an English court applying a standard of fundamental fairness when charges were not preferred for more than two years.
18. Ross v. United States, 8upra note 1, at 215.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
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The Ross case represents a departure from prior law in
several important respects."0 But in another sense. and more
fundamentally, it is a logical and necessary extension of existing law. This conclusion is compelled when one considers the
fact that the uniderlying reasons for the sixth amendment
protection are also the reasons underlying the decision in
the principal case. Without going into all of the purposes
of the sixth amendment, it may be said with certainty that a
critical one is to afford the defendant an opportunity to
properly prepare a defense."0 He cannot do this at a time
so far removed from the date of the offense that witnesses
are unavailable and the accused cannot remember what happened at the critical time. This factor is obviously present
in cases in which the delay was between offense and charge
as well as those in which delay was between charge and trial.
In fact, it may be an even more salient feature in such cases.
The person who is not charged may never know that there
will ever be a trial. He is not put on notice and therefore has
no reason to fix in his mind the occurrences of the day in
question or otherwise preserve evidence. The importance of
the delay is magnified in cases like Ross in which the prosecution's case is very weak. In the language of the Ross case,
"The Government's case should, at the least, have more substance than the one before us if it is to override the appellant's
interest in earlier notification.'"2 1
To deny redress from the very evils intended to be
remedied by the sixth amendment on the grounds that the
defendant is not formally charged seems unjust. Yet, that
is the result obtained by the application of traditional speedy
trial doctrines. The 'decision in the Ross case, supplementing
these doctrines with the due process clause, eliminates the
anomaly while leaving intact the limitations of the sixth
amendment which the courts and legislatures have deemed

it wise to impose.

EDWARD L. GRANT

19. For a brief discussion of the extent to which the type of deliberate delay
used by police in the Ross case is employed by police in general, see La Faye.
ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 220 (The Report
of the American Bar Foundation's Survey of the Administration of Criminal
Justice in the United States, 1965).
20. See People v. Prosser, supra note 7; Petition of Provoo, supra note 11;
Taylor v. United States, supra note 13.
21. Ross v. United States, supra note 1, at 216.
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